













College of Information Science and Technology 
    
      
 
Drexel E-Repository and Archive (iDEA) 
http://idea.library.drexel.edu/   
 
 













The following item is made available as a courtesy to scholars by the author(s) and Drexel University Library and may 
contain materials and content, including computer code and tags, artwork, text, graphics, images, and illustrations 
(Material) which may be protected by copyright law. Unless otherwise noted, the Material is made available for non 
profit and educational purposes, such as research, teaching and private study. For these limited purposes, you may 
reproduce (print, download or make copies) the Material without prior permission. All copies must include any 
copyright notice originally included with the Material. You must seek permission from the authors or copyright 
owners for all uses that are not allowed by fair use and other provisions of the U.S. Copyright Law. The 
responsibility for making an independent legal assessment and securing any necessary permission rests with persons 
desiring to reproduce or use the Material. 
 
 
Please direct questions to archives@drexel.edu
 




Abstract: Recent research on instructional technology has focused increasingly on the 
potential of computer support to promote collaborative learning. Socio-cultural theories 
have been imported from cognate fields to suggest that cognition and learning take place 
at the level of groups and communities as well as individuals. Various positions on this 
issue have been proposed and a number of theoretical perspectives have been 
recommended. In particular, the concept of common ground has been developed to explain 
how meanings and understandings can be shared by multiple individuals. This paper takes 
a critical look at the concept of shared meaning as it is generally used and proposes an 
empirical study of how group cognition is constituted in practice. 
 
Keywords: Collaboration, Common Ground, Distributed Cognition, Group Meaning, 
CSCL. 
 
Among those researchers working on computer assisted learning, a community has emerged in 
the past decade known as computer-supported collaborative learning, or CSCL (Crook, 1994; 
Dillenbourg, 1999; O'Malley, 1995). In an influential attempt to define this paradigm of research, 
Koschmann (1996) argues that previous forms of instructional technology research “approach 
learning and instruction as psychological matters (be they viewed behavioristically or 
cognitively) and, as such, are researchable by the traditional methods of psychological 
experimentation” (p. 10f). That is, they focus on the mind of the individual student as the unit of 
analysis when looking for instructional outcomes, learning, meaning-making or cognition. By 
contrast, the paradigm of CSCL “is built upon the research traditions of those disciplines—
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, communication science—that are devoted to understanding 
language, culture and other aspects of the social setting” (p. 11). This radical paradigm shift, 
focusing on “the social and cultural context as the object of study, produces an 
incommensurability in theory and practice relative to the paradigms that have come before” 
(p.13).  
The incommensurability between CSCL and other paradigms of computer assisted learning 
becomes clear if we phrase it this way: in the CSCL perspective, it is not so much the individual 
student who learns and thinks, as it is the collaborative group. Given that we have for millennia 
become used to taking learning and thinking as activities of individual minds, it is hard to 
conceive of them as primarily group activities. Of course, this approach does not deny that 
individuals often think and learn on their own, but rather that in situations of collaborative 
activity it is informative to study how processes of learning and cognition take place at the group 
level. Thus the question of group cognition can be viewed as largely a methodological, rather 
than ontological issue: it is a call to analyze case studies of collaboration at the group unit of 
analysis, rather than a claim that some kind of group mind exists beyond the situated and 
transient group discourse itself. As Stahl (2003) argued, one can identify processes of meaning-
making or knowledge-building in the interaction that cannot be attributed to any individual group 
members, although the participation of the individuals in the group process is necessary as 
sources of contributed utterances and as interpreters of the shared meaning. 
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In fact, analysis at the group level of description often demonstrates that even when someone 
learns or thinks in seeming isolation, this activity is essentially conditioned or mediated by 
important social considerations. This was a general claim of Vygotsky (1930/1978): that 
intersubjective or inter-psychological or group learning generally preceded individual or intra-
psychological learning, which resulted from the internalization of what took place socially. 
Koschmann points out that Vygotsky—one of the principle theoretical sources for CSCL—
proposed the “zone of proximal development” as “a mechanism for learning on the inter-
psychological plane” (p.12). Vygotsky (1930/1978) contrasted his conception of potential social 
development to the traditional psychological focus on individual learning, saying, “In studies of 
children’s mental development it is generally assumed that only those things that children can do 
on their own are indicative of mental abilities” (p. 85). Vygotsky’s alternative social conception 
of development was meant to measure a child’s position in the “process by which children grow 
into the intellectual life of those around them” (p. 88; italics in original), as opposed to their 
mental position in doing tasks on their own. The italicized phrase is strikingly similar to the 
definition of situated learning by  Lave & Wenger (1991)—another central source of CSCL’s 
theory of learning. Related foundations of the CSCL paradigm include Hutchins’ (1996) 
presentation of distributed cognition and Suchman’s (1987) discussion of situated action. Despite 
the attempt by these traditions within CSCL to overcome the traditional focus of educational and 
psychological theories on the individual as cognitive agent, none of them have worked out a 
satisfactory theory of group cognition. 
Stahl (2003) drew on the aforementioned and other sources to argue for taking meaning that is 
constructed in successful processes of collaboration as a shared group product, which is, 
however, necessarily subject to interpretation by the individuals involved. As much as the 
writings on situated action, distributed cognition, social constructivism, activity theory, social 
practice, etc. have foregrounded the social nature of learning and thinking, it is still hard for most 
people to overcome their individualistic conceptual traditions and come to terms with group 
learning or group cognition. This paper is an attempt to further that effort by considering just 
what is meant by shared meaning and group cognition. 
THE PROBLEM OF SHARED MEANING 
The analysis by Stahl (2003) tried to provide insight into the nature of the group perspective. It 
argued for a view of both shared group meaning and individual interpretation. Shared meaning 
was not reduced to mental representations buried in the heads of individuals. Such mental 
contents could only be inferred from introspection and from interpretation of people’s speech 
and behavior, whereas socially shared meaning can be observed in the visibly displayed 
discourse that takes place in group interactions, including non-verbal communication and 
associated artifacts. This approach does not result in a behaviorist denial of human thought in 
bracketing out inferred mental states and focusing on observable interaction, because of the 
methodological recognition of interpretive perspectives. People are considered to be interpreting 
subjects, who do not simply react to stimuli but understand meanings. 
It is true that only individuals can interpret meaning. But this does not imply that the group 
meaning is just some kind of statistical average of individual mental meanings, an agreement 
among pre-existing opinions, or an overlap of internal representations. A group meaning is 
constructed by the interactions of the group’s individual members, not by the individuals on their 
own. It is an emergent property of the discourse and interaction. It is not necessarily reducible to 
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opinions or understandings of individuals. Stahl (2004) presented an example of how this works. 
The discourse transcribed there is strikingly elliptical, indexical and projective; that means that it 
implies and requires a (perhaps open-ended) set of references to complete its meaning. These 
references are more a function of the history and circumstances of the discourse than of 
intentions attributable to specific participants. The words in the analyzed collaborative moment 
refer primarily to each other, to characteristics of the artifacts discussed and to group 
interactions. In fact, one can only attribute well-defined opinions and intentions to the individual 
students after one has extensively interpreted the meanings of the discourse as a whole. As seen 
in the example transcript, the shared meaning was collaboratively created by the group as a 
whole. But the establishment of that meaning as shared involved a process of negotiation through 
which the individual group members had to interpret the meaning from their own personal 
perspectives, to display their understanding of the meaning and to affirm that meaning as shared. 
The collaborative process itself entailed corresponding individual processes. In a sense, one can 
say both that the individuals learned as a result of the group learning, and that the group could 
only learn by ensuring that the individuals learned. Of course, the kind of “learning” that 
happens in a brief interaction is not the kind of learning that educators look for over months. It is 
perhaps better referred to as “knowledge building,” in which some word or utterance takes on a 
new shared meaning. To understand what takes place in collaborative interactions, it seems 
important to become clearer about the nature of shared knowledge—how it is produced, 
negotiated, distributed and internalized. 
The major difficulty in understanding shared knowledge and group cognition is that it is 
habitual to attribute thoughts and intentions to individual actors—and to reduce group 
phenomena to actions of the individual group members. One assumes that a speaker’s words are 
well-defined in advance in the speaker’s mind and that the discourse is just a way for the speaker 
to express some preconceived meaning and to convey it to the listeners. This reveals a conflict. If 
meaning is socially constructed, why do researchers feel compelled to treat it as private property; 
if it takes place in isolated minds, how can it ever be shared and understood collaboratively? The 
possibility of shared meaning must be somehow explained. This is particularly important in cases 
of collaborative learning, where the knowledge that is constructed must be shared among the 
learners (or may be shared first, before it can become part of an individual’s knowledge). 
The term “shared knowledge” is ambiguous. It can refer to: 
• Similarity of individuals’ knowledge: The knowledge in the minds of the members of a group 
happen to overlap and their intersection is “shared.”  
• Knowledge that gets shared: Some individuals communicate what they already knew to the 
others. 
• Group knowledge: Knowledge is interactively achieved in discourse and may not be 
attributable as originating from any particular individual. 
The ambiguity of this term corresponds to different paradigms of viewing group interaction: 
whether it is taken to be a result of individual knowledge, reducible to knowledge held by 
individual thinkers or an emergent property of the group discourse as an irreducible unit for 
purposes of analysis. If CSCL is to be conceived as a fundamentally new educational form, 
rather than just a technique for fostering individual learning, than it seems that something like the 
third reading of “shared knowledge” needs to be explicated. 
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A CONFLICT OF PARADIGMS 
Research on learning and education is troubled to its core by the conflict of paradigms we are 
considering. Sfard (1998) reviewed some of the history and consequences of this conflict in 
terms of the incompatibility of the acquisition metaphor (AM) of learning and the participation 
metaphor (PM). AM conceives of education as a transfer of knowledge commodities and their 
subsequent possession by individual minds. Accordingly, empirical research in this paradigm 
looks for evidence of learning in changes of mental contents of individual learners. PM, in 
contrast, locates learning in intersubjective, social or group processes, and views the learning of 
individuals in terms of their changing participation in the group interactions. AM and PM are as 
different as day and night, but Sfard argues that we must learn to live in both complementary 
metaphors. 
The conflict is particularly pointed in the field of CSCL. Taken seriously, the term 
“collaborative learning” can itself be viewed as self-contradictory given the tendency to construe 
learning as something taking place in individual minds. Having emerged from the paradigm shift 
in thinking about instructional technology described by Koschmann (1996), the field of CSCL is 
still enmeshed in the paradigm conflict between opposed cognitive and socio-cultural focuses on 
the individual and on the group (Kaptelinin & Cole, 2002). In his keynote at the CSCL ’02 
conference, Koschmann (2002a) argued that even exemplary instances of CSCL research tend to 
adopt a theoretical framework that is anathema to collaboration. Koschmann recommended that 
talk about “knowledge” as a thing that can be acquired should be replaced with discussion of 
“meaning-making in the context of joint activity” in order to avoid misleading images of learning 
as mental acquisition and possession of knowledge objects.  
Although Koschmann’s alternative phrase can describe the intersubjective construction of 
shared meanings achieved through group interaction, the influence of AM can re-construe 
meaning-making as something that must perforce take place in individual human minds, because 
it is hard for most people to see how a group can possess mental contents. Stahl (2003) argued in 
effect that both Koschmann’s language and that of the researchers he critiqued is ambiguous and 
is subject to interpretation under either AM or PM. A simple substitution of wording is 
inadequate; it is necessary to make explicit when one is referring to individual subjective 
understanding and when one is referring to group intersubjective understanding—and to make 
clear to those under the sway of AM how intersubjectivity is concretely possible. 
The problem with recommending that researchers view learning under both AM and PM or 
that they be consistent in their theoretical framing is that our common sense metaphors and 
widespread folk theories are so subtly entrenched in our thinking and speaking. The languages of 
Western science reflect deep-seated assumptions that go back to the ideas of Plato’s Meno (350 
BC/1961) and the ego cogito of Descartes’ Meditations (1633/1999). It is hard for most people to 
imagine how a group can have knowledge, because we assume that knowledge is a substance 
that only minds can acquire or possess, and that only physically distinct individuals can have 
minds (somewhere in their physical heads). The term meaning as in shared meaning carries as 
much historical baggage as the term knowledge in knowledge building. 
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THE RANGE OF VIEWS 
CSCL grows out of research on cooperative learning that demonstrated the advantages for 
individual learning of working in groups (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 1989). There is still 
considerable ambiguity or conflict about how the learning that takes place in contexts of joint 
activity should be conceptualized. While it has recently been argued that the key issues arise 
from ontological and epistemological commitments deriving from philosophy from Descartes to 
Hegel (Koschmann, 2002b; Packer & Goicoechea, 2000), Stahl (2004) argued that it is more a 
matter of focus on the individual (cognitivist) versus group (sociocultural) as the unit of analysis. 
Theoretical positions on the issue of the unit of learning (e.g., in the compilations of essays on 
shared cognition (Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991) or distributed cognition (Salomon, 1993)) 
take on values along a spectrum from individual to group. The following is an attempt to 
characterize possible positions along this spectrum, most of which have been advocated for in 
the literature: 
• Learning is always accomplished by individuals, but this individual learning can be 
assisted in settings of collaboration, where individuals can learn from each other. 
• Learning is always accomplished by individuals, but individuals can learn in different 
ways in settings of collaboration, including learning how to collaborate. 
• Groups can also learn, and they do so in different ways from individuals, but the 
knowledge generated must always be located in individual minds. 
• Groups can construct knowledge that no one individual could have constructed alone by a 
synergistic effect that merges ideas from different individual perspectives. 
• Group knowledge can be spread across people and artifacts; it is not reducible to the 
knowledge of any individual or the sum of individuals’ knowledge. 
• Groups construct knowledge that may not be in any individual minds, but may be 
interactively achieved in group discourse and may persist in physical or symbolic artifacts 
such as group jargon or texts or drawings. 
• Learning is always a mix of individual & group processes; the analysis of learning should 
be done with both the individual and group as units of analysis and with consideration of 
the interplay between them. 
• Individual learning takes place by internalizing or externalizing knowledge that was 
already constructed inter-personally; even modes of individual thought have been 
internalized from communicative interactions with other people. 
• All human learning is fundamentally social or collaborative; language is never private; 
meaning is intersubjective; knowledge is situated in culture and history. 
These different positions imply different answers to why CSCL is important. At one extreme of 
the spectrum, collaboration is only valued to the extent that it results in learning outcomes for 
individual minds. At the other extreme, collaborative learning can benefit a whole community of 
practice by developing cultural artifacts like theories. Intermediate positions may acknowledge 
that benefits accrue at group and individual levels in parallel, through reciprocal influences. 
The different positions listed above are supported by a corresponding range of theories of 
human learning and cognition. Educational research on small group process in the 1950’s and 
1960’s maintained a focus on the individual as learner (Johnson & Johnson, 1989; Stahl, 2000). 
Classical cognitive science in the next period continued to view human cognition as primarily an 
individual matter—internal symbol manipulation or computation across mental representations, 
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with group effects treated as secondary boundary constraints (Simon, 1981; Vera & Simon, 
1993). In reaction to these views, a number of socio-cultural theories have become prominent in 
the learning sciences in recent decades. To a large extent, these theories have origins in much 
older works that conceptualized the situated-ness of people in practical activity within a shared 
world (Bakhtin, 1986; Heidegger, 1927/1996; Husserl, 1936/1989; Marx, 1867/1976; Schutz, 
1967; Vygotsky, 1930/1978).  
The following list describes some representative theories that focus on the group as a possible 
unit of knowledge construction. Of course, each theory is itself too complex to be summarized 
meaningfully in a sentence, consisting of multiple texts and redefining terms like “learning” and 
“knowledge” in the process of developing a theory:  
• Collaborative Knowledge Building. A group can build knowledge that cannot be attributed to 
an individual or to a combination of individual contributions, but that exists as textual 
artifacts that can be critiqued by others (Bereiter, 2002; Donald, 1991). 
• Social Psychology. One can and should study knowledge construction at both the individual 
and group unit of analysis, as well as studying the interactions between them (Fischer & 
Granoo, 1995; Resnick et al., 1991; Salomon, 1993).  
• Distributed Cognition. Knowledge can be spread across a group of people and the tools that 
they use to solve a problem (Hutchins, 1996; Norman, 1993). 
• Situated Cognition. Knowledge often consists of resources for practical activity in the world 
more than of rational propositions or mental representations (Schön, 1983; Suchman, 1987; 
Winograd & Flores, 1986). 
• Situated Learning. Learning is the changing participation of people in communities of 
practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Shumar & Renninger, 2002). 
• Zone of Proximal Development. Children grow into the intellectual life of those around them; 
they develop in collaboration with adults or more capable peers (Vygotsky, 1930/1978). 
• Activity Theory. Human understanding is mediated not only by physical and symbolic 
artifacts, but also by the social division of labor and cultural practices (Engeström, 1999; 
Nardi, 1996). 
• Ethnomethodology. Human understanding, inter-personal relationships and social structures 
are achieved and reproduced interactionally (Dourish, 2001; Garfinkel, 1967). 
One does not have to commit to one of these theories in particular in order to gain a sense from 
them all of the possible nature of group knowledge. Most of these theories hinge on the question 
of how it is possible for shared knowledge to be established. Despite this, none of these authors 
have explained how groups can learn in sufficient detail to overcome widespread resistance to 
thinking about learning at the group level of description. 
COMMON GROUND OR GROUP COGNITION? 
Within CSCL, it is usual to refer to the theory of “common ground” to explain how collaborative 
understanding is possible. Baker et al. (1999), for instance, note that collaboration requires 
mutual understanding among the participants, established through a process of “grounding.”  
It is certainly clear that effective communication is generally premised on the sharing of a 
language, of a vast amount of practical background knowledge about how things work in the 
physical and social world, of many social practices implicit in interaction and of an orientation 
within a shared context of topics, objects, artifacts, previous interactions, etc. Much of this 
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sharing we attribute to our socialization into a common culture or overlapping sub-cultures. Most 
common ground is taken for granted as part of what it means to be human. The 
phenomenological hermeneutics of Heidegger (1927/1996) and Gadamer (1960/1988)—building 
on the traditions of Dilthey and Husserl—made explicit the ways in which human understanding 
and our ability to interpret meaning rely upon a shared cultural horizon. It emphasized the 
centrality of interpretation to human existence as being engaged in the world. It also considered 
cases where common ground breaks down, such as in interpreting ancient texts or translating 
from foreign languages—e.g., how can a modern German or American understand a theoretical 
term from a Platonic dialogue or from a Japanese poem? 
The current discussion of common ground within CSCL is, however, more focused. It is 
concerned with the short-term negotiation of common ground during brief interactions. Such 
negotiation is particularly visible when there is a breakdown of the common ground, an apparent 
problem in the mutual understanding. A breakdown appears through the attempt of the 
participants to repair the misunderstanding or lack of mutuality. For instance, in the presentations 
of Roschelle (1996) and Stahl (2004) much of the transcribed discourse was analyzed as attempts 
to reach shared understandings in situations in which the group discussion had become 
problematic. 
It is not always clear whether repairs to breakdowns in such common ground come from ideas 
that existed in someone’s head and are then passed on to others until a consensus is established, 
or whether the common ground might be constructed in the interaction of the group as a whole. It 
is possible that shared knowledge can sometimes be best explained in one way, sometimes 
another. At any rate, it seems that the question of the source of shared knowledge should 
generally be treated as an empirical question. This is what is proposed in the next section of this 
paper. But first, this alternative should be made a bit clearer. 
The theory of common ground that Baker et al. (1999), Roschelle (1996) and many others in 
CSCL refer to is that of Clark and his colleagues. Clark & Brennan (1991) situate their work 
explicitly in the tradition of conversation analysis (CA), although their theory has a peculiarly 
mentalist flavor uncharacteristic of CA. They argue that collaboration, communication and “all 
collective actions are built on common ground and its accumulation” (p. 127). The process of 
updating this common ground on a moment-by-moment basis in conversation is called 
“grounding.” Grounding, according to this theory, is a collective process by which participants 
try to reach mutual belief. It is assumed that understanding (i.e., mutual belief) can never be 
perfect (i.e., the participants can never have beliefs that are completely identical). It suffices that 
“the contributor and his or her partners mutually believe that the partners have understood what 
the contributor meant to a criterion sufficient for current purposes” (p. 129). Clark & Brennan 
(1991) then show how various conversational moves between pairs of people can conduct this 
kind of grounding and achieve a practical level of mutuality of belief. They go on to show how 
different technologies of computer support mediate the grounding process in different ways. 
Clark’s contribution theory—where one participant “contributes” a personal belief as a 
proposed addition to the shared common ground and then the participants interact until they all 
believe that they have the same understanding of the original belief, at which point their common 
ground is “updated” to include the new contribution—is articulated in the language of individual 
mental beliefs, if not to say in the jargon of computer models of rational memories. Thus, it is 
not surprising that Schegloff (1991) responds polemically to Clark & Brennan (1991) by 
opposing the tradition of ethnomethodology and CA to this theory of mental beliefs: Schegloff 
points out that Garfinkel (1967) “asked what exactly might be intended by such notions as 
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‘common’ or ‘shared’ knowledge. In the days when computers were still UNIVACS, Garfinkel 
viewed as untenable that notion of common or shared knowledge that was more or less equal to 
the claim that separate memory drums had identical contents” (p. 151f). Schegloff then presented 
an analysis of repair in talk-in-interaction that contrasted with Clark’s by construing what took 
place as a social practice following social patterns of interaction. According to Schegloff’s 
approach, repair is a form of socially shared cognition that takes place in the medium of 
discourse (in the broad sense of social interaction-in-talk), following established conversational 
patterns, rather than a transfer and comparison of beliefs between rationalist minds. 
In a recent critique of Clark’s contribution theory of common ground, Koschmann & LeBaron 
(2003) present video data of an interaction in an operating room. A resident, an attending doctor 
and an intern are discussing the location of internal organs as viewed indirectly through a 
laparoscopic camera. Koschmann & LeBaron argue that the discourse that takes place does not 
match Clark’s rubric, and that the very notion of belief contributions to some kind of common 
ground storage space is not useful to understanding the construction of shared understanding in 
this situation. Although the operation is successful and although technology-supported 
collaborative learning takes place, the beliefs of the individual participants afterwards do not 
agree in Clark’s sense.  
Perhaps the case of the operating room (OR) illustrates Vygotsky’s contrast between a 
person’s individual developmental level and their social developmental level (separated by the 
zone of proximal development). The intern was able to participate in the collaborative activity 
even though he could not correctly identify key items on his own even afterwards. This might 
indicate that what takes place in group interactions cannot reliably be reduced to behaviors of the 
individuals involved. The knowledge and abilities of people in individual and group settings are 
quite different. The group cognition of the OR team would then not be a simple sum of the 
individual cognitive acts of its members; the group understanding would not be a simple 
intersection or overlap of individual beliefs.  
Of course, the OR situation was a special case which differed in significant ways from most 
everyday conversation. Often, interaction can be adequately analyzed as the exchange of 
personal beliefs. This is particularly true of dyadic conversations, such as those in Clark’s 
examples, rather than in the more complex interactions of small groups of three or more in the 
OR or in CSCL generally. The question for CSCL is: can sets of students be transformed into 
groups that learn collaboratively in ways that encourage the emergence of collaborative group 
cognition in a significant sense? This is, above all, an empirical question, although it requires a 
clear conceptual framework for defining and interpreting the data. 
EMPIRICAL INQUIRY INTO GROUP COGNITIVE PRACTICES 
At Drexel University, an interdisciplinary group of researchers and staff of the Math Forum @ 
Drexel—mathforum.org, a popular online site with resources and problems related to K-12 
school mathematics—are undertaking a research project to investigate empirically whether 
knowledge sharing in community contexts can construct group knowledge that exceeds the 
individual knowledge of the group’s members. Our hypothesis is that precisely such a result is, 
in fact, the hallmark of collaborative learning, understood in an emphatic sense. This research is 
based on earlier work that indicated the possibility of observing group cognition. As mentioned 
above, Roschelle’s (1996) study of two students constructing a new (for them) conception of 
acceleration can be construed as an analysis of shared knowledge building. As Koschmann 
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(2002a) pointed out, the analytic paradigm of that paper is ambiguous. It’s focus on the 
problematic of convergence posits the conceptual change as taking place in the minds of the two 
individual students, while at the same time raising the issue of the possibility of shared 
knowledge. The study reported by Stahl (2004) was an attempt to analyze knowledge building at 
the group level by a group of five students. Stahl’s analysis was in some respects similar to 
Roschelle’s. Our current research project takes Stahl’s study as a pilot study and  aims to 
generate a corpus of group interactions in which problem solving and knowledge building can be 
most effectively observed at the group level. 
Like many studies of collaborative learning (but unlike our proposed math study), the pilot 
study involved face-to-face interaction with an adult mentor present. Close analysis of student 
utterances during an intense interaction during that study suggested that the group developed an 
understanding that certainly could not be attributed to the utterances of any one student. In fact, 
the utterances themselves were meaningless if taken in isolation from the discourse and its 
activity context.  
There were, however, a number of limitations to the study:  
(1) Although the mentor was quiet for the specific interaction analyzed, it might be possible 
to attribute something of the group knowledge to the mentor’s guiding presence.  
(2) The digital videotape was limited in capturing gaze and even some spoken wording.  
(3) The data included only two sessions, too little to draw conclusions about how much 
individual students understood of the group knowledge before, during or after the 
interaction.  
To overcome such limitations, in our current study:  
(1) Mentors are not active in the collaborative groups—although the groups work on 
problems that have been carefully crafted to guide student inquiry and advice can be 
requested by email from Math Forum staff.  
(2) The online communication is fully logged, so that researchers have a record of the 
complete problem-solving interaction, essentially identical to what the participants see 
online.  
(3) Groups and individuals are studied during longer, more multi-faceted problem-solving 
sessions—and in some cases over multiple sessions. 
Despite its limitations, the pilot study clearly suggested the feasibility of studying group 
knowledge. It showed how group knowledge can be constructed in discourse and how discourse 
analysis can “make visible” that knowledge to researchers.  
We are investigating not only whether computer-supported collaborative learning can 
construct novel group knowledge, but what community contexts are favorable to fostering such 
an outcome. We are doing this by designing and implementing an experimental service in the 
Math Forum. Students visiting the site are invited to join small virtual teams to discuss and solve 
math problems collaboratively online. We analyze the interactions in these teams to determine 
how they build shared knowledge within the Math Forum virtual community.  
We are addressing the issue of the nature of shared understanding by studying online 
collaborative learning in the specific context of Math Forum problems, with the aim of 
presenting empirical examples of concrete situations in which groups can be seen to have 
knowledge that is distinct from the knowledge of the group members. By analyzing these 
situations in detail, we will uncover mechanisms by which understanding of mathematics passes 
back and forth between the group as the unit of analysis and individual group members as units 
of analysis.  
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One example might be a group of 5 middle school students collaborating online. They solve 
an involved algebra problem and submit a discussion of their solution to the Math Forum. By 
looking carefully at the computer logs of their interactions in which they collaboratively 
discussed, solved and reflected upon the problem, we can see that the group solution exceeds the 
knowledge of any individual group members before, during or after the collaboration. For 
instance, there may be some arguments that arose in group interaction that none of the students 
fully understood but that contributed to the solution. Or a mathematical derivation might be too 
complicated for any of the students to keep “in mind” without reviewing preserved chat archives 
or using an external representation the group developed in an online whiteboard. By following 
the contributions of one member at a time, it may also be possible to find evidence of what each 
student understood before, during and after the collaboration, and thereby to follow individual 
trajectories of participation in which group and individual understandings influenced each other. 
While we do not anticipate that group knowledge often exceeds that of all group members 
under generally prevailing conditions, we hypothesize that it can do so at least occasionally 
under particularly favorable conditions. We believe that we can set up naturalistic conditions as 
part of a Math Forum service and can collect sufficient relevant data to demonstrate this 
phenomenon in multiple cases. The analysis and presentation of these cases should help to 
overcome the AM/PM paradigm conflict by providing concrete illustrations of how knowledge 
can be built through group participation as distinct from—but intertwined with—individual 
acquisition of part of that knowledge. It should also help to clarify the theoretical framing of acts 
of meaning-making in the context of joint activity. 
Student discourse is increasingly recognized as of central importance to science and math 
learning (Bauersfeld, 1995; Lemke, 1990). Discourse analysis is a rigorous human science, going 
under various names: conversation analysis, interaction analysis, micro-ethnography, 
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984; Jordan & Henderson, 1995; Sacks, 1992; 
Streeck & Mehus, 2003). This method of analysis will allow us to study what takes place through 
the collaborative interactions. We will be looking for evidence of learning at the micro level, 
where shared meanings are developed and knowledge is built up as part of solving a challenging 
math problem. 
The focus on discourse suggests a solution to the confusion between individual and group 
knowledge, and to the conceptual conflict about how there can be such a thing as group 
knowledge distinct from what is in the minds of individual group members. One way of putting 
it is that meaning is constructed in the group discourse. The status of this meaning as shared by 
the group members is itself something that must be continually achieved in the group interaction; 
frequently the shared status “breaks down” and a “repair” is necessary. In the pilot study, the 
interaction of interest centered on precisely such a repair of a breakdown in shared understanding 
among the discussants. While meaning inheres in the discourse, the individual group members 
must construct their own interpretation of that meaning in an on-going way. Clearly, there are 
intimate relationships between the meanings and their interpretations, including the interpretation 
by one member of interpretations by other members. But it is also true that language can convey 
meanings that transcend the understandings of the speakers and hearers. It may be precisely 
through divergences among different interpretations or among various connotations of meaning 
that collaboration gains much of its creative power (Stahl, 2003).  
These are questions that we will investigate as part of our micro-analytic studies of 
collaboration data, guided by our central working hypothesis:  
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• H0 (collaborative learning hypothesis): A small online group of learners can—on 
occasion and under favorable conditions—build group knowledge and shared meaning 
that exceeds the knowledge of the group’s individual members. 
We believe that such an approach can maintain a focus on the ultimate potential in CSCL, rather 
than losing sight of the central phenomena of collaboration as a result of methods that focus 
exclusively on statistical trends (Stahl, 2002).  
ISSUES FOR FUTURE INVESTIGATION 
While we believe that it is possible to clarify the nature of shared knowledge and group cognition 
by serious reflection upon the existing theoretical discussions and case studies that touch on 
these concepts (many of which have been referenced in this paper), we are convinced that 
significant progress and convincing arguments will require further empirical research, such as 
that proposed in the online math project.  
Collaborative success is hard to achieve and probably impossible to predict. CSCL represents 
a concerted attempt to overcome some of the barriers to collaborative success, like the difficulty 
of everyone in a group effectively participating in the development of ideas with all the other 
members, the complexity of keeping track of all the inter-connected contributions that have been 
offered, or the barriers to working with people who are geographically distant. As appealing as 
the introduction of technological aids for communication, computation and memory seem, they 
inevitably introduce new problems, changing the social interactions, tasks and physical 
environment. Accordingly, CSCL study and design must take into careful consideration the 
social composition of groups, the collaborative activities and the technological supports. 
In order to observe effective collaboration in an authentic educational setting, we are adapting 
a successful math education service to create conditions that will likely be favorable to the kind 
of interactions that we want to study. We must bring together groups of students who will work 
together well, both by getting along with and understanding each other and by contributing a 
healthy mix of different skills. We must also carefully design mathematics curriculum packages 
that lend themselves to the development and display of deep math understanding through 
collaborative interactions – open-ended problems that will not be solved by one individual but 
that the group can chew on together in online interaction. Further, the technology that we provide 
to our groups must be easy to use from the start, while meeting the communicative and 
representational needs of the activities.  
As part of our project, we will study how to accomplish these group formation, curriculum 
design and technology implementation requirements. This is expressed in three working 
hypotheses of the project: H1, H2 and H3. Two further working hypotheses define areas of 
knowledge building that the project itself will engage in on the basis of our findings. H4 draws 
conclusions about the interplay between group and individual knowledge, mediated by physical 
and symbolic artifacts that embody knowledge in persistent forms. H5 reports on the analytic 
methodology that emerges from the project: 
• H1 (collaborative group hypothesis): Small groups are most effective at building knowledge 
if members share interests but bring to bear diverse backgrounds and perspectives. 
• H2 (collaborative curriculum hypothesis): Educational activities can be designed to 
encourage and structure effective collaborative learning by presenting open-ended problems 
requiring shared deep understanding. 
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• H3 (collaborative technology hypothesis): Online computer support environments can be 
designed to facilitate effective collaborative learning that overcomes limitations of face-to-
face communication. 
• H4 (collaborative cognition hypothesis): Members of collaborative small groups can 
internalize group knowledge as their own individual knowledge and they can externalize it in 
persistent artifacts.  
• H5 (collaborative methodology hypothesis): Quantitative and qualitative analysis and 
interpretation of interaction logs can make visible to researchers the online learning of small 
groups and individuals. 
We believe that the theoretical confusion surrounding the possibility of group knowledge 
presents an enormous practical barrier to collaborative learning. Because students and teachers 
generally believe that learning is necessarily an individual matter, they find the effort at 
collaborative learning to be an unproductive nuisance. For researchers, too, the misunderstanding 
of collaborative learning distorts their conclusions, leading them to look for effects of 
pedagogical and technological innovation in the wrong places. If these people understood that 
groups can construct knowledge in ways that significantly exceed the sum of the individual 
contributions and that the power of group learning can feed back into individual learning, then 
we might start to see the real potential of collaborative learning realized on a broader scale. This 
project aims to produce rigorous and persuasive empirical examples of collaborative learning to 
help bring about the necessary public shift in thinking. 
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